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INTRODUCTION
The taxation of lawsuit recoveries is complicated because it
must be analyzed on two levels. First, damage payments are
treated identically with the thing for which they substitute. For
instance, when a tenant fails to pay rent and the landlord sues
for unpaid rent and recovers damages, the damages are treated
as the receipt of rent.' To conclude otherwise would permit con-
version of income, possibly from rental income to capital gain,
through the mere expedient of filing lawsuits or asserting
claims. The general rule, which sensibly obviates such income
conversion, is encapsulated in the form of the question: in lieu
of what were the damages awarded?2 By using the "in-lieu-of"
test plus the broad definition of income ("accessions to wealth,
clearly realized, over which the taxpayers have complete domin-
ion"), 3 nearly all damage recoveries give rise to taxable income.
Second, various statutory exclusions are available to exempt
certain kinds of damages from income. Principally, statutory ex-
clusion is applied to tort damages recovered in personal injury
suits. However, other kinds of damages exclusions, such as the
recovery of employee benefits, certainly do exist.
The second step, the statutory exclusion, is in conflict with
the first, as by definition all exceptions negate the general rule
to which they are exceptions. The exclusion converts what would
be taxable income under the initial "in-lieu-of" test into income
that is not taxable. However, courts often conflate the two steps
when they deny application of an exclusion because the dam-
ages recovered are in lieu of something that would be taxable
income. Such a conclusion solely addresses the first step, for it
is only when the damages recovered pass the "in-lieu-of" test
that we care about the application of a statutory exclusion. In-
deed, the conflation reads the exclusion out of the tax law, for if
§ 104(a)(2) simply creates an "in-lieu of' test, then it repeats the
general rule of damages taxation. Some have suggested that the
1. See Hort v. Commissioner, 313 US. 28, 30 (1941).
2. See Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1297 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th
Cir. 1988).




"in-lieu-of' test is a theory for interpreting § 104(a)(2). 4 Instead
of conflating the first step into the second, denial of exclusions
must rest solely upon the interpretation of the exclusion's text
and reach. Unfortunately, with regard to the exclusion from in-
come for damages recovered on account of personal injury, the
conflation has caused a lack of focus on the exclusion and a re-
sultant failure to develop a coherent theory or policy underlying
it.
Lawsuit recovery taxation issues have arisen when applying
the exclusion from income in § 104(a)(2), which excluded (until
amendment in 1996) "damages received on account of personal
injury."5 The Supreme Court construed that phrase three times
in five terms, parsing "personal injury" in the first two cases
and "on account of" in the last two.6 Congress recently came
close to lessening the need for judicidial interpretation by ad-
ding the word "physical" to now exclude damages received be-
cause of personal physical injury. However, this clarification
does not entirely eliminate the interpretation problems within
the clause. Section 104(a)(2) litigation survives, for neither the
Court nor Congress have resolved the fundamental tension be-
tween the exclusion and its purported tax policy foundation. Un-
til that tension is resolved, indeterminacy in applying the rule
will persist.
The purported tax policy behind § 104(a)(2) excludes dam-
ages which substitute for "personal assets that the Government
does not tax and would not have taxed had the victim not lost
them."" Consider spousal consortium, which Congress recently
used to describe an application of § 104(a)(2). 9 Persons acquire
the right to spousal consortium through marriage. Neither the
wealth-enhancing "acquisition" of a right to spousal consortium
by getting married nor the wealth-enhancing "use" of that con-
sortium during marriage is taxed. Nonetheless, damages for loss
4. See Debra Cohen-Whelan, From Injury to Income: The Taxation of Punitive Dam-
ages 'On Account Of" United States v. Schleier, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 913 (1996).
5. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994).
6. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 452 (1996); Commissioner v. Schleier, 515
U.S. 323 (1995); Burke v. United States, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
7. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (Supp. H 1996) (as amended by Small Business Jobs Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755).
8. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 452, 456 (1996) (explaining that excluda-
ble damages typically are those substituting for a normally untaxed personal or financial
quality, good or asset-personal assets that the Government does not tax and would not
tax had the victim not lost them).
9. See SiALL BusiNEss JOB PROTECTION AcT OF 1996, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737,
at 301, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA-.N. 1677, 1793.
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of spousal consortium would be taxable under the first step, the
"in-heu-of" test of damages taxation, because the damages arise
from a conversion of a personal right into cash.10 While the exis-
tence and creation of personal rights is not taxed, the conversion
of them into clearly realized accessions to wealth, such as cash,
is taxable. For instance, the "right" to leisure is not taxed, but
conversion (voluntarily or involuntarily) of the right to leisure
into payment for services is taxable.
The exclusion of § 104(a)(2) negates the results of the first
step regarding damages for lost spousal consortium. It reflects
the view that because the wealth enhancement of spousal con-
sortium is not taxed, damages substituting for lost consortium
should not be taxed." Similarly, other aspects of living, like the
joy of life, are not taxed. Therefore, damages for lost joy of life
should not be taxed either.
The aggregate of personal attributes and rights whose exis-
tence is not taxed is known as human capital. 2 Normally, the
tax law ignores both accessions to, and losses of, human capi-
tal.13 Section 104(a)(2)'s purported tax policy ignores, for tax
purposes, the restoration of human capital tortiously damaged
by another by excluding it from income. That is, if one loses
spousal consortium from divorce or the death of a spouse, no tax
deduction is allowed for the loss. Yet, if one loges spousal consor-
tium because of a tortious act and recovers damages, the dam-
ages are excluded from income as restoration of tortiously dam-
aged human capital. The fundamental tension in applying
10. A recovery for lost consortium would not be taxable under step one if: (1) the
taxpayer had an income tax basis in the consortium right exceeding the amount of cash,
and (2) the basis-recovery-ordering rule was basis first.
11. Following amendment in 1996, § 104(a)(2) reflects a view that damages for lost
spousal consortium are excluded when either spouse suffered physical injury and not ex-
cluded when neither spouse suffered physical injury. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-737, at
301, reprinted in 1996 US.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1793.
12. See Paul B. Stephan, Federal Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1357, 1358-59 (1984).
Human capital, in economic terms, is equivalent to the present value of the
flow of future satisfactions that an individual can command in the course of
his life. Some portion of this capital constitutes endowment, the biological and
social inheritance that accompanies a person into the world. The remainder is
acquired through individual action, such as education, on-the-job training, mi-
gration and health care, and stems from exogenous changes such as technologi-
cal or social transformation.
Id.
13. See Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Human Capital Acquisition Costs-Or Why Costs
of Higher Education Should Not Be Deducted or Amortized, 54 OHio ST. L.J. 927, 959
(1993).
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§ 104(a)(2) arises because no case has limited the exclusion to
damages fitting the human capital restoration policy.
The exclusion, developed in 1918 shortly after enactment of
the modern income tax,14 has always excluded some damages
that would have been taxable had the victim not lost them. For
instance, the exclusion has always included at least some kinds
of lost wages,'15 yet the conflict with the purported policy is clear.
Consequently, the purported tax policy-tax-free restoration
of tortiously damaged human capital-has never adequately ex-
plained either the courts' or Congress' construction of
§ 104(a)(2). The cases can be described only in an ad hoc man-
ner. Perhaps worse than no theory is a bad theory,16 and at-
tempts by courts to fit case results within the purported tax pol-
icy have resulted in a stilted two-prong test.'7
Oddly, all .agree that the human capital restoration policy
cannot explain the boundary cases.'8 The arguments center on
14. The exclusion from taxation was originally created by administrative ruling and
subsequently codified by the Revenue Act of 1918. See 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 308 (1918);
T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6),
40 Stat. 1066.
15. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 452, 456 (1996).
We concede that the original provision's language does go beyond what one
might expect a purely tax-policy-related "human capital" rationale to justify.
That is because the language excludes from taxation not only those damages
that aim to substitute for a victim's physical or personal well-being-personal
assets that the Government does not tax and would not have taxed had the
victim not lost them. It also excludes from taxation those damages that substi-
tute, say, for lost wages, which would have been taxed had the victim earned
them. To that extent, the provision can make the compensated taxpayer better
off from a tax perspective than had the personal injury not taken place.
Id.
16. A good theory requires satisfaction of two requirements: (1) the theory must use
a model, containing few arbitrary elements, to accurately describe a large class of obser-
vations; and (2) the theory must make concise predictions regarding the results of future
observations. See STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 9 (1988).
17. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
18. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 452, 456 (1996) ("We concede that the
original provision's language does go beyond what one might expect a purely tax-policy-
related 'human capital' rationale to justify"); Leandra Lederman Gassenheimer, The Ex-
cludability of Employment Discrimination Awards under Code Section 104(a)(2) after
Burke v. United States and Commissioner v. Schleier, 28 ARiz. ST. L.J. 315, 317 n.10
(1996) (citing Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage Awards be Taxed?, 38
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 43, 44 (1987)); Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive Dam-
ages for a Personal Injury: To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2 FLA. TAx REv. 327, 341 (1995)
("While there is uncertainty as to precisely what considerations led Congress to adopt
the antecedent to section 104(a)(2), the background history of the provision suggests that
Congress focused on a 'return of human capital' theory.") (citing Edward Yorio, The Taxa-
tion of Damages: Tax and Non-Tax Policy Considerations, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 701, 712);
Kahn, supra, at 344 ("[S]ome courts and commentators have suggested that the human
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the extent to which the statute deviates from its purported tax
policy. 9 The boundary cases are scattered data points. They can
be considered ad hoc decisions devoid of any theoretical coher-
ence which could explain why the purported policy wins in some
cases but loses in others. Two principal solutions present them-
selves: (1) conform the results to the theory (for example, fix the
anomalous exclusion of lost wages); or (2) develop a coherent
theory to explain the boundary cases. I develop both solutions in
Part V and summarize them here.
First, the human capital restoration policy could be applied
according to its pure terms, without exception. Such a pure
human capital restoration policy requires a sharp theoretical
distinction between lost wages due to a period of convalescence
and lost wages due to impairment of earning capacity. The for-
mer would be treated as taxable current income, the latter as a
recovery of principal.20 Distinguishing between impaired earning
capacity and convalescent lost wages has three benefits: it (1)
conforms the human capital restoration policy to the larger prin-
ciples of income tax law; (2) makes the accident tax-neutral; and
(3) mirrors an allocation sourced in tort law.
Human capital restoration policy, and indeed much of in-
come taxation, is based on the efficiency of distinguishing be-
tween income and principal.21 Earning capacity is in the nature
of principal, because it is a store of value from which periodic
income issues. 22 When principal, sometimes called capital, is
capital theory is undercut by the fact that the section 104(a)(2) exclusion extends to
damages in substitution for lost income"); Mary L. Heen, An Alternative Approach to the
Taxation of Employment Discrimination Recoveries under Federal Civil Rights Statutes:
Income from Human Capital, Realization, and Nonrecognition, 72 N.C. L. REV. 549, 608
(1995); Cohen-Whelan, supra note 4, at 918.
However, debate over § 104(a)(2) began with congressional failure to incorpo-
rate the return of capital theory into the statutory language of its predecessor,
§ 22. The codification of § 22 and § 104(a) as exclusions from income makes the
taxation of personal injury damages independent of their characterization as
income. Thus, the return of capital analysis should be inapplicable to the taxa-
tion of personal injury awards.
Cohen-Whelan, supra. See also Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CoRNELL L. REv.
143, 147 (1992) ("At the core of section 104 is the issue of recoveries for injuries to
'human capital,' i.e., damages for lost wage-earning capacity, including recoveries for lost
past wages. Both historic and present-day theories of exclusion (or inclusion) ultimately
derive from a conception of human capital."); Dodge, supra, at 155 ("[T]he conventional
replacement-of-capital theory cannot sustain an exclusion for personal injury recoveries
19. See O'Gilvie, 117 S.Ct. at 456.
20. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 179.
22. See infra note 180.
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converted into a damages payment of cash, taxable income re-
sults under the "in-lieu-of" test unless the tax basis in the capi-
tal exceeds the recovery 23 Calculating adjusted basis in human
capital is notoriously difficult. A distinction between impaired
earning capacity and convalescent lost wages interprets
§ 104(a)(2) in a manner which lessens the need for that difficult
basis calculation.
Moreover, distinguishing impaired earning capacity and
convalescent lost wages for the purposes of § 104(a)(2) restores
the victim to pre-accident status, making the accident tax-neu-
tral. Whife'the restoration of the principal sum of human capital
is not taxed, the income produced by the restored principal will
be taxed, as financial income on the now monetized capital re-
places what would have been labor income from human capi-
tal.24 Furthermore, the process of making distinctions between
impaired earning capacity and convalescent lost wages raises al-
location issues; however, allocations are endemic to the law of
damages taxation, for rarely does the litigant assert both a sin-
gle claim and single element of damages. Perhaps it is for that
reason that no court has ever permitted difficulties in allocation
to trump policy in § 104(a)(2) cases. 25 Notwithstanding the three
benefits to distinguishing between impaired earning capacity
and convalescent lost wages, the theory would require either
statutory amendment or retreat by the Supreme Court from
dicta repeated in three recent cases. Neither is likely, although,
as I note in Part V, it would solve the current problems of
interpretation.
Second, instead of recognizing a theory distinguishing im-
paired earning capacity and convalescent lost wages, we could
concentrate specifically on the boundary cases in applying
§ 104(a)(2). From the boundary cases, one can discern that an
unexpressed coherent theory has been developed. Invariably,
when courts limit the § 104(a)(2) exclusion, they do so by con-
cluding that the damages at issue substitute for taxable income
and are taxable as such. This is done so as not to provide a
windfall to the taxpayer.2 6 However, as noted, this conclusion
23. I.R.C. § 1001 (1994).
24. See infra note 185.
25. In Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 332 (1995), the Court held that back
pay and liquidated damages recovered in an employment discrimination action were not
excludable, but that damages for the intangible harms of discrimination (which are per-
mitted under some discrimination claims) would be excludable. That resolution obviously
creates a need to allocate damages.
26. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 452, 456 (1996) ("exclusion from gross
income provides the taxpayer with a windfall"); Hemelt v. United States, 122 F.3d 204,
1998] 353
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conflates the two steps of damages recovery taxation. Equally
problematic is the labeling of some damages by courts as includ-
ible economic damages in contrast to excludable personal injury
damages.2 7 But not all such economic damages are denied exclu-
sion, for lost wages-undeniably economic damages-sometimes
are excluded from income.28 When pressed, the Supreme Court
described the exclusion of those lost wages as an "anomaly," and
as a circumstance not justifying "the extension of the anomaly
or the creation of another."29 Consequently, the boundaries of the
anomaly describe the reach of § 104(a)(2), and I concentrate on
those cases in Part I.
I. THE ANOMALOUS EXCLUSION OF LOST WAGES IN SOME CASES
The boundary cases in application of § 104(a)(2) have al-
ways occurred where the tort victim and tortfeasor had an eco-
nomic relationship prior to the rise of the tort claim. When the
converse is true, for example, the victim and tortfeasor are
strangers, § 104(a)(2) simply has governed and no finely sliced
questions of human capital recovery versus economic damages
are considered. That suggests that the real tax policy underlying§ 104(a)(2) is kindness to tort victims,3 0 which dissipates when
the victim and tortfeasor have a pre-existing economic
relationship.
209 (4th Cir. 1997) (Thus the decision to deny them a double windfall by denying a re-
fund of the income taxes paid is a sound one."). Describing an exclusion from income as
a windfall is not helpfil; Congress has enacted some exclusions from income and, wind-
falls or not, they must be construed.
27. Sch/eier, 515 US. at 331. When the Tax Court ultimately abandoned the distinc-
tion of personal injuries and economic damages, it succinctly described the problems of
that approach.
Where, however, a taxpayer's injuries are nonphysical we have, in the past, ig-
nored the personal nature of the claim and delved into an inquiry regarding
the nature of the consequences of the injury ... Not only does the distinction
between damages for injury to personal reputation and those for professional
reputation create an inconsistency between physical and nonphysical personal
injuries that is analytically irreconcilable, the distinction also lacks a firm
foundation in the case law of this Court.
Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.Ct. 1294, 1300-01 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1988) (citations omitted).
28. Schleier, 515 US. at 329.
29. O'Gilvie, 117 S.Ct. at 456 (citing Bernard Wolfman, Current Issues of Federal
Tax Policy, 16 U. Anm LrrL ROCK L.J. 543, 549-50 (1994) ("To build upon' what is,
from a tax policy perspective, the less easily explained portion 'of the otherwise rational
exemption for personal injury,' simply 'does not make sense.' ")).
30. See Heen, supra note 18, at 560-61.
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Kindness apparently dissipates because income taxation
takes special interest in the exchange of contract rights and
strains to ensure that exchanges of contract rights are not "hid-
den" as tort compensation. While we are kind to tort victims, we
will police artful conversions by economically-related tortfeasors
and victims of what otherwise would be taxable income (eco-
nomic damages) into excludable income. Yet, the cases never ar-
ticulate either the kindness rationale3l or any other principled
distinction to differentiate why economic damages are excluded
in one case but not in another. Nonetheless, we can observe that
in nearly all circumstances where "economic damages" are de-
nied exclusion, the victim and tortfeasor were "economically
related."3 2
The archetypal case involving § 104(a)(2), according to the
Supreme Court (at least until increased frequency of dignitary
torts), is a car crash, in which the victim recovers damages for
medical expenses, lost wages and pain and suffering.3 3 No court,
including the Supreme Court, ever has suggested that lost
wages in a car crash are not excludable, notwithstanding the
conflict with the purported human capital restoration policy.34
Yet, beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing through the re-
cent actions of the Court and Congress, narrowing construction
of the exclusion with respect to lost wages has occurred in cases
involving employment discrimination.3 5
Courts began to balk at excluding lost wages in employment
discrimination cases, notwithstanding universal recognition that
employment discrimination causes personal injury.3 6 At some
31. See J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related
Personal Injury Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 MONT. L. REV. 13, 43 (1989). The kind-
ness rationale, as the reason for the anomalous exclusion for lost wages, always has
seemed cramped to me. Apparently, we recognize the anomaly but limit it to victims of
physical injury. See Kahn, supra note 18, at 357 ("In general, the plight of a victim who
has suffered only nonphysical injuries does not arouse anything like the sympathy that
is engendered by a physical injury."). Yet, if kindness is the reason, why are we not simi-
larly "kind" to victims of employment discrimination or even to people who have been
laid off and receive severance pay? If kindness really were our chief concern, I would im-
agine that we should focus on what it means to be "injured" and which injuries evoke
compassion. No reason ever has been advanced why physically-injured persons uniquely
deserve compassion.
32. See infra note 197.
33. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 329.
34. O'Gilvie, 117 S.Ct. at 456.
35. See infra Part II.
36. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 332 n.6 (agreeing with dissenting opinion that employment
discrimination causes personal injury but concluding that the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA) does not compensate for personal injuries).
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fundamental level, the courts and the Internal Revenue Service
have wanted to distinguish lost wages in car crashes from lost
wages in employment discrimination cases, and multiple ana-
lytic modalities were employed.3 7 No modality focused on the
distinction I find critical: the pre-existing economic relationship
of the victim and tortfeasor. Instead, the Courts and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service used: (1) a distinction between physical and
nonphysical injuries not in the pre-1996 statute;38 (2) a dam-
ages-focused "in-lieu-of' test conflating the general rule and its
exception; 39 (3) a claims-focused test excluding nearly every-
thing;40 and (4) a false test of "causation" for employment dis-
crimination cases.41 Most recently, Congress settled upon one
easier to state, but equally hard to understand,42 when in 1996
it decided to distinguish physical and nonphysical injury cases.4"
Not surprisingly, the shifting analytic modalities altered the
results. Examination of the analytic modalities employed by
courts in deciding the taxation of employment discrimination
awards reveals a serpentine path, with results alternating be-
tween partially taxable, completely not taxable and completely
taxable lost wages.
II. THE SERPENTINE PATH FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
RECOVERIES
Extensive prohibition against discrimination in employment
began in the 1960s with the passage of the Federal Civil Rights
Acts." However, it was not until the mid-1970s that the tax con-
sequences of those recoveries were decided.45 Through a series of
cases, the Tax Court construed the pre-1996 version of
§ 104(a)(2) to distinguish between physical and nonphysical in-
jury cases and rarely excluded lost wages in nonphysical injury
cases. 46 Although subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court
37. See infra Part II.
38. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
40. See infra note 68.
41. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
42. Neither the 1996 Act nor its legislative history answers whether the physical in-
jury requirement is a Burke-type requirement in that, once present, all damages are ex-
cludable, or is a Schleier-type requirement in that we must decide whether each element
of damages is caused by physical injury.
43. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
44. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 Title VII, § 703.
45. Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 616, 619 (1975).
46. See infra note 52.
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on the distinction between physical and nonphysical injuries,47
the Tax Court's view ultimately prevailed in the 1996 amend-
ment. While a certain symmetry describes the completed path,
the route between beginning and end twists in serpentine fash-
ion. As the analytic modalities changed, treatment of employ-
ment discrimination damages progressed as follows: first par-
tially taxable, then completely not taxable, completely taxable,
completely not taxable, partially taxable and now completely
taxable.48 No one analytic modality has ever overcome the other,
because none could resolve the fundamental tension between the
human capital restoration policy and the anomalous exclusion of
lost wages in car crash cases. The persistent attempt to develop
an analytic modality to distinguish lost wages in employment
discrimination cases from those in car crashes suggests a widely
held desire to limit the anomalous exclusion of lost wages when
the victim and tortfeasor are economically related.
A. Partially Taxable
The first court to decide the taxation of employment dis-
crimination recoveries was the Tax Court in 1975.49 Three years
earlier, the Tax Court distinguished between physical and non-
physical injury cases.50 However, no reason was given for why
47. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330 n.4 ("Though the text of § 104(a)(2) might be con-
sidered ambiguous on this point, it is by now clear that § 104(a)(2) encompasses recov-
eries based on intangible as well as tangible harms.") (citing Burke, 504 U.S. at 237 n.6.).
Although the IRS briefly interpreted § 104(a)(2)'s statutory predecessor to re-
strict the scope of personal injuries to physical injuries, the courts and the IRS
long since have recognized that § 104(a)(2)'s reference to "personal injuries" en-
compasses, in accord with common judicial parlance and conceptions of non-
physical injuries to the individual, such as those affecting emotions, reputation
or character, as well .... Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's contention in his
separate opinion that the term 'personal injuries" must be read as limited to
"health"-related injuries, the foregoing authorities establish that § 104(a)(2) in
fact encompasses a broad range of physical and nonphysical injuries to per-
sonal interests.
Id. (citations omitted).
48. The textual discussion draws from and updates an earlier article. See F. Philip
Manns Jr., Down and Out: RIFed Employees, Taxes, and Employment Discrimination
Claims After Burke and Schleier, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 103, 114-20 (1995). The serpentine
path traced by analytic modalities in employment discrimination cases demonstrates the
failure of any modality to carry the day, and provides headaches to tax lawyers who try
to discern what law was effective when. As I had to answer those questions as I wrote
this section, I prepared a chart of effective dates, and I have set out the chart as an
Appendix.
49. Hodge, 64 T.C. at 616.
50. See Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 40 (1972) (holding damages received for
embarrassment, mental strain and injury to personal reputation excludable under
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lost wages in physical injury cases are different from those in
nonphysical injury cases.51 Nonetheless, because no physical in-
juries are involved in employment discrimination, 52 the Tax
Court, beginning with Hodge v. Commissioner,53 applied the rule
distinguishing between the two types of injuries to employment
discrimination recoveries. Under this rule for nonphysical injury
cases, each component of damages was analyzed separately.
Those economic damage components substituting for otherwise
taxable income were denied exclusion. Lost wages were not ex-
cludable because "had there been no discrimination against the
petitioner, he would have received a better job without a lawsuit
and would have paid more taxes on increased pay as received."5 4
As generally applied to employment discrimination recoveries,
the actual wage losses arising from the discriminatory employ-
ment action, commonly known as back pay,5 5 were taxable. Liq-
uidated damages, however, were excludable despite the fact that
they are sometimes awarded in an amount equal to back pay."
§ 104(a)(2)).
51. See Patricia T. Morgan, Old Torts, New Torts and Taxes: The Still Uncertain
Scope of Section 104(a)(2), 48 LA. L. REv. 875, 916 (1988) ("[Any recovery that is purely
for back pay will be found taxable.").
52. See Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1300 (1986) ("Where, however, the
damage award is received for a nonphysical injury, we have previously mounted an in-
quiry to determine whether the components of the injuries for which the award is made
are personal or professional."), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1988).
53. 64 T.C. 616 (1975).
54. Id. at 619.
55. Most employment discrimination statutes then limited remedies to lost wages,
also called back pay, and liquidated damages equal to back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)
(1994); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1995). Availability of liquidated damages sometimes turns on
the mental state of the defendant. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1994). Employment discrimination
statutes also typically include the remedy of reinstatement, and often money called
"front pay" is awarded in lieu of reinstatement. In addition, attorneys' fees are awarded
to the prevailing party, prejudgment interest is paid and the court is authorized to grant
injunctive relief. See 2 SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, EMPLOYmENT DiscanIINATION § 14.1
(2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996).
56. See Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 616, 619 (1975) (holding that Title VII back
pay is taxable); Thompson v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 632, 648 (1987) (classifying back pay
under the Equal Pay Act as taxable, but liquidated damages under the Equal Pay Act as
excludable); Rickel v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 510, 521-22 (1989) (concluding that ADEA
back pay is taxable, but ADEA liquidated damages are excludable); Wirtz v. Commis-
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B. Completely Not Taxable
Next, while the Fourth Circuit appeared to agree with both
the Tax Court's physical and nonphysical distinction between in-
juries and its analysis of the individual components in nonphysi-
cal injury cases,57 every other court of appeals rejected that ap-
proach.5 8 The component approach confused the nature of a
claim with its consequences (the components of its relief). There-
fore, the courts of appeal, except for the Fourth Circuit, uni-
formly concluded that whenever a claim arises under a statute,
the claim is tort-like, for the duty arises by operation of law
rather than express or implied contract.59 Consequently, the
sioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1596, 1598 (1989) (holding that ADEA front pay is taxable);
Sparrow v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 816, 821 (1989) (classifying Title VII front
pay as taxable).
57. See Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e con-
clude that Thompson received the liquidated damages through prosecution of a tort-type
claim for personal injuries. We conclude, however, that the claim for back pay was essen-
tially a contractual claim for accrued wages."), affg 89 T.C. 632 (1987).
58. See infra note 104.
59. See Bryne v. Commissioner, 883 R2d 211, 215 (3d Cir. 1989) ("This duty [against
unlawful employment discrimination] is independent of any duty an employer might owe
his employee pursuant to an express or implied employment contract; it arises by opera-
tion of law. Thus, the statutory claim seeks to remedy a statutory violation that the law
has defined as wrongful."), rev'g 90 T.C. 1000 (1988); Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d
145, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'g 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 874 (1989).
Reviewing the nature of Pistillo's claim, we conclude that his age discrimina-
tion lawsuit is analogous to the assertion of a tort-type right to redress per-
sonal injuries. Cleveland Tool discriminated against Pistillo on the basis of his
age and invaded the rights Pistillo "is granted by virtue of being a person in
the sight of the law." Contrary to the arguments of the Commissioner, Pistillo
has not brought separate actions to seek back pay damages for his pain and
suffering.
Id. (citing Threlkeld, 87 T.C. 1294, 1308 (1986)). See also Redfield v. Insurance Co. of
North America, 940 F2d 542, 546 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Nothing in the ADEA reflects a con-
gressional attempt to rewrite the terms of employment contracts. ADEA actions are
analogous to other federal discrimination causes of actions, many of which have been de-
scribed in explicitly tort-like languagef). The Third Circuit stridently rejected the com-
ponents analysis of the Tax Court and the Service. Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655,
661-62 (3d Cir. 1990), rev'g 92 T.C. 510 (1989).
[O]nce it found that age discrimination was analogous to a personal injury and
that the taxpayer's ADEA action amounted to the assertion of a tort type right,
the Tax Court should have ended its analysis and found that all damages flow-
ing therefrom were excludable under § 104(a)(2). By going further and rum-
maging through the taxpayer's prayers for relief in order to determine the na-
ture of his claim, the Tax Court was simply defining the nature of the
taxpayer's injury by reference to its nonpersonal consequences, an approach we
explicitly rejected in both Bent and Byrne, and the full Tax Court rejected in
Threlkeld.
Rickel, 900 F.2d at 661-62. The court also noted:
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near-uniform rule of the circuits treated physical and nonphysi-
cal injury cases the same and excluded all damages recovered
on account of employment discrimination claims.60 Thus, those
courts applied a "nature of the claim" approach. Later, the Tax
Court confessed error in the components analysis and agreed
with the courts of appeal that § 104(a)(2) depends on a claims
analysis. In doing so, the Tax Court reversed itself.61
C. Completely Taxable
The Supreme Court in United States v. Burke62 agreed with
the court of appeals' "nature-of-the-claim" focus when it con-
cluded that a claim is tort-like only if it provides broad remedial
components consistent with "traditional tort liability."63 Sex dis-
crimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, sex, religion and national origin, was not considered tort-
like by the Court because Title VII then limited remedies to
back pay.6
Thus, to the extent that the Commissioner, in spending an inordinately large
part of his brief attempting to establish that at least half of the settlement
comprised payment for back pay, is arguing that "because the settlement was
intended to compensate [the taxpayer] for economic losses it is therefore com-
pensating [him] for non-personal injuries, we find this argument to have been
rejected in Bent [and Byrne] and we reject it again here" for the third time.
Rickel, 900 F.2d at 662 n.9 (emphasis in original) (quoting Byrne, 883 F.2d at 214).
60. See supra note 59.
61. See Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1300. See also Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150,
161 (1991), aff'd on reh'g, 100 T.C. 634 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
Although the direction of the necessary inquiry would seem straightforward,
some confusion has arisen in the past when the focus has shifted from the
source and character of the injury (a tortious invasion of personal rights) to its
consequences. Those consequences are irrelevant for purposes of the inquiry re-
quired by § 104(a)(2).
Downey, 97 T.C. at 161 (citations omitted). In Downey v. Commissioner, the Tax Court
concluded that ADEA damages are "damages received on account of personal injur[y,"
and consequently not included in the recipients gross income. 97 T.C. 150, 156 (1991).
62. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
63. Id. at 237 ("We thus agree with the Court of Appeals' analysis insofar as it fo-
cused, for purposes of § 104(a)(2), on the nature of the claim underlying respondents'
damages award.") (citing Burke, 929 F.2d at 1121).
64. Id. at 238. The Court said that Title VII "limits available remedies to back pay,
injunctions, and other equitable relief." Id. at 238. The injunctions and other equitable
relief to which the court refers grant the courts power to order reinstatement or mone-
tary relief in lieu of reinstatement, sometimes called front pay. See id. at 238 n.9; see
also 2 SuLnvAN, ZinxAR, & RicHARDs, EMPLoymrr DISCRMNATION, § 14.1 (2d ed. 1988 &
Supp. 1996).
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Under the court of appeals' "nature-of-the-claim" test, reme-
dial components were considered only at the threshold in an ef-
fort to decide whether a claim is tort-like. Once the nature of
the claim was decided, all damage elements were grouped to-
gether as either all taxable or all non-taxable. In Burke, the
Court did not address this aspect, for it concluded that the claim
in question was not tort-like.65 However, the Court strongly im-
plied that if broad remedies were available (making the claim
tort-like), all damages recovered would be excludable. 66
D. Completely Not Taxable
Following Burke, every court deciding the issue, except one
district court,67 interpreted Burke to hold that once a claim is
judged "tort-like" all components of its relief are excluded from
income.68 This, coupled with the significant broadening of the
65. 504 U.S. at 237.
66. Burke contrasted Title VII with 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (prohibit-
ing race-based employment discrimination) and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968
(prohibiting housing discrimination), noting that § 1981 and Title VIII provide for
awards of compensatory and punitive damages, while Title VII awards only back pay.
See Burke, 504 U.S. at 240. The Court thereby implied that employment discrimination
claims for which broad damages are available are tort-like. Id. The inherent conflict in
Burke and Schleier on this point was recognized by the Supreme Court in O'Gilvie v.
United States, 117 S.Ct. 452, 458 (1996) (noting that the "[Burke] dicta [supported] a
view somewhat like that of petitioners" and contrary to the court's decision in O'Gilvie).
67. Every v. I.R.S., 74 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5614 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d 279
(9th Cir. 1995).
68. After Burke but before Schleier, in Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61, suspended by
Notice 95-45, 1995-34 I.R.B. 20, obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6, the Service
acknowledged exclusion for all amounts recovered under (1) Title VII gender-based dis-
parate treatment claims as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, (2) Title VII racial
discrimination claims as amended, and (3) Americans With Disabilities Act claims, be-
cause the claims, as amended, gave rise to sufficiently broad remedies to be tort-like.
The ruling was based itself on the Court's dicta in Burke, in which the Court implied
that all damages recovered under § 1981 would be excludable. Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2
C.B. 61 (citing Burke, 504 U.S. at 239-40). Thus, pre-Schleier the testing ground for ap-
plying Burke was the ADEA, because exclusion for virtually all other employment dis-
crimination recoveries had been conceded.
Prior to Burke, the three courts of appeals deciding the issue, and ultimately the
Tax Court as well, decided that ADEA claims were tort-like because they arise under a
statute. See Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, 940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991);
Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d
655 (3d Cir. 1990); Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150 (1991). Burke rejected that
analysis, and focused instead on the remedies available for a claim. Burke, 505 U.S. at
239-40. Consequently, the ADEA decisions required reconsideration after Burke; the Tax
Court and nine other courts decided the issue. Decisions of the Fifth Circuit, Ninth Cir-
cuit, Tax Court, Court of Federal Claims, Eastern District of California and District of
New Jersey conclude that damages received on account of ADEA claims are excludable
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remedies available for employment discrimination under the
Civil Rights Act of 1991,69 meant that damages received for em-
ployment discrimination were completely not taxable. The
broadening of substantive remedies made such causes of action
tort-like under Burke, and, once a cause of action is tort-like, all
damages are excluded from income.
E. Partially Taxable
Although everyone interpreted Burke to mean that once the
claim was tort-like all damages recovered were excludable,70 the
Supreme Court did not. In Commissioner v. Schleier,71 the Court
"clarified" Burke by holding that the "nature-of-the-claim" test is
prong one of a two prong test.7 2 At issue in this case was taxa-
tion of an ADEA recovery, by which persons discriminated
against on the basis of age can recover lost wages and, if the vi-
olation is willful, liquidated damages in an amount equal to lost
wages. 73 This constrained measure of damages was sufficient to
decide the case under the Burke prong, for the Court decided
that an ADEA claim was not "tort-like."74 The Court developed
the second prong [hereinafter Schleier prong], and in a later
case, called both grounds alternative holdings.7 5 Under the
from income; the Seventh Circuit, two district courts in the Eleventh Circuit and a Dis-
trict Court in Illinois, which rendered its decision two weeks before the Seventh Circuit's
decision in another ADEA case, conclude otherwise. See Downey v. Commissioner, 33
F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), rev'g 100 T.C. 634 (1993); Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790
(9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 1139 (1995); Purcell v. Sequin State Bank, 999 F.2d
950 (5th Cir. 1993); Rice v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd, 35 F.
3d 571 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated sub nom, Commissioner v. Schmitz, 515 U.S. 1139 (1995);
Bennett v. United States, 30 Fed. CI. 396 (1994), rev'd, 60 F.3d 843 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 584 (D. N.J. 1994), aff'd, 50 F.3d 1204 (3d Cir.
1995); Drase v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 1077 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Shaw v. United States,
853 F. Supp. 1378 (M.D. Ala. 1994); Maleszewski v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 1553
(N.D. Fla. 1993). As well, the General Counsel of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission opined that under the Burke analysis, ADEA damages are excludable from
income. However, within a week, he rescinded that conclusion "pursuant to the view of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue." Memorandum from Donald R. Livingston, Gen-
eral Counsel EEOC, to Regional Attorneys (Mar. 1, 1993), reprinted in 41 Daily Labor
Report F-1 (BNA) (1993) (revising Memorandum (Feb. 23, 1993), reprinted in 34 Daily
Labor Report E-1 (BNA) (1993)).
69. See infra note 80.
70. See supra note 68.
71. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
72. "[S]atisfaction of Burke's 'tort or tort type' inquiry is a necessary condition for
excludability under § 104(a)(2), it is not a sufficient condition." Id. at 336.
73. Id. at 325-26.
74. Id. at 335-36.
75. O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452, 455 (1996).
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Schleier prong the taxpayer, using principles of proximate cau-
sation, must show that each element of the damages was re-
ceived "on account of personal injury or sickness." 76 The Court
applied this causation test to each category of damages present
in the ADEA case: lost wages and liquidated damages. Accord-
ing to Schleier, while the intangible harms of discrimination can
constitute personal injury, neither ADEA lost wages nor ADEA
liquidated damages compensates for the intangible harms of dis-
crimination.77 The Court contrasted lost wages in car crashes to
those in age discrimination cases, because in car crashes, "the
accident causes a personal injury which in turn causes a loss of
wages." 78 However, "in age discrimination, the discrimination
causes both personal injury and loss of wages, but neither is
linked to the other."79
Although Schleier authoritatively negates exclusion for lost
wages and liquidated damages in an ADEA case, whether it ar-
ticulates a rule of greater application is open to debate. Courts
have divided on the question, and it is more fully explored in
Part IV.
Consequently, following Schleier, employment discrimina-
tion damages generally became partially taxable. Although
ADEA damages were fully taxable under Schleier, the remedies
for most employment discrimination claims (aside from ADEA
claims) had been expanded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to in-
clude compensatory damages for the intangible harms of dis-
crimination.80 Partial taxation for employment discrimination
damages was ruled on in Revenue Ruling 96-65.81 The Service
decided that, under the law effective after Schleier and prior to
76. "First, the taxpayer must demonstrate that the underlying cause of action giving
rise to the recovery is 'based upon tort or tort type rights'; and second, the taxpayer
must show that the damages were received 'on account of personal injuries or sickness!"
Schleier, 515 U.S. at 337. The court held that neither ADEA back pay nor ADEA liqui-
dated damages met either of the "two independent requirements that a taxpayer must
meet before a recovery may be excluded under § 104(a)(2)." Id.
77. Id. at 330-31.
78. Id. at 330.
79. Id. at 330.
80. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a new section, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994), ap-
plies concurrently with and in addition to Title VII. It permits recovery of "compensatory
and punitive damages," 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), subject to aggregate limits of between
fifty thousand dollars and three hundred thousand dollars, depending on the size of the
employer, for (1) "unlawful intentional discrimination" in employment on the basis of
race, sex, religion and national origin under Title VII; and (2) Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA) disparate treatment claims. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D) (1994). Addi-
tionally, a jury trial is available for § 1981a claims. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994).
81. Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6.
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the 1996 Act, lost wages were included in income, but damages
received for emotional distress were excludable from gross in-
come. The Tax Court agreed.8 2
F. Fully Taxable
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,83 amended§ 104(a)(2) to exclude "damages (other than punitive damages)
received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump
sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical
injuries or physical sickness."84 It adds that "emotional distress
shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness"
except to the extent of medical care for emotional distress.85 The
legislative history targets claims of employment discrimination
or injury to reputation:
Damages received on a claim not involving a physical injury or phys-
ical sickness (e.g., employment discrimination or injury to reputation) are
generally to compensate the claimant for lost profits or lost wages that
would otherwise be included in taxable income. The confusion as to the
tax treatment of damages received in cases not involving physical injury
or physical sickness has led to substantial litigation, including two Su-
preme Court cases within the last four years. The Congress believed that
the taxation of damages received in cases not involving a physical injury
or physical sickness should not depend on the type of claim made....
The Small Business Act provides that emotional distress is not consid-
82. Barnes v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1754 (1997) (awarding damages for
emotional distress and punitive damages under a wrongful termination claim to an em-
ployee fired for giving a deposition against her employer and holding that the emotional
distress damages were excludable from taxation). Similarly, in two allocation cases,
Simko v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCI1) 1679 (1997) and Phillips v. Commissioner, 74
T.C.M. (CCII) 187 (1997), the Tax Court agreed that emotional distress damages recov-
ered from a former employer could be excluded, but the taxpayers had failed to prove
that the payor intended to pay personal injury damages rather than damages for breach
of contract. See also Gassenheimer, supra note 18, at 315, 331-32.
The more difficult question is whether the damages received as compensation
for the emotional pain and mental anguish of discrimination would be excluda-
ble. Under Schleier, they seem to be received "on account of" intangible per-
sonal injuries. Although Burke requires characterizing the claim as a whole, it
does not seem to prohibit separating damages into excludable and includible
portions according to whether or not they meet the Schleier test. Thus, the
best answer under the case law may be to allow exclusion of only the personal
injury portion of the recovery received under a statute that passes the Burke
test.
Gassenheimer, supra.
83. Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, § 1605 (1996).
84. Id. (noting that the additions to the statute are in italics).
85. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (Supp. 1H 1996).
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ered a physical injury or physical sickness. Thus, for example, the exclu-
sion from gross income does not apply to any damages received (other
than for [certain] medical expenses .. .) based on a claim of employment
discrimination or injury to reputation accompanied by a claim of emo-
tional distress.8 6
Consequently, the 1996 Act negates the exclusion for all
damages recovered from employment discrimination claims.
First, the Act requires a physical injury, absent in employment
discrimination. Second, it forecloses arguments that emotional
distress attached to such discrimination is a physical injury. The
serpentine path for employment discrimination seems to have
found its end, with employment discrimination damages fully
taxable. However, the application of the Schleier prong outside
of employment discrimination cases has not been settled either
by Schleier or the 1996 Act.
The 1996 Act's legislative history provides:
[I]f an action has its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness, then
all damages (other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom are
treated as payments received on account of physical injury or physical
sickness whether or not the recipient of the damages is the injured party.
For example, damages (other than punitive damages) received by an in-
dividual on account of a claim for loss of consortium due to the physical
injury or physical sickness of such individual's spouse are excludable
from gross income.8
7
Thus, the 1996 Act re-creates the Schleier causation issue. Is
the damage flowing from the physical injury or from some other
injury? To what extent is the Schleier causation prong applica-
ble to the 1996 Act's new physical injury requirement? While
settling the taxation of employment discrimination recoveries, in
the majority of cases where there is no physical injury, the 1996
Act creates more problems of interpretation. Is the new physical
injury requirement a Burke-type requirement in that once pres-
ent all damages are excludable, or is the it a Schleier-type re-
quirement in that we must decide whether each element of dam-
ages is caused by physical injury? I address that question in
Part IV, but its existence makes me disagree with the observa-
tion by Professor Chirelstein that the "lively and interesting"
discussion of § 104(a)(2) now belongs to the past given the pas-
sage of the 1996 Act.88
86. STAFF OF JOINT COMI. ON TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION EN-
ACTED IN THE 104TH CONGREss 223-24 (Comm. Print 1996).
87. HR.. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 301, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1793.
88. MARviN A. CmELSTEIN, FEDERAL INcoziE TAxATION: A LAW STUDENT'S GUIDE TO
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III. POST-SCHLEIER: PROBING THE SCHLEIER CAUSATION PRONG
Prior to its creation by the Supreme Court, the Schleier
prong had not been developed in the lower federal courts, the
literature, or the parties' briefs; indeed everyone read Burke to
negate any damages-based focus in applying § 104(a)(2).19 In the
Schleier prong, the Court struggles with the fundamental ten-
sion within § 104(a)(2), as the lower federal courts had for
twenty years 0 The tax policy underlying § 104(a)(2) does not
tax damages restoring tortiously damaged human capital. How-
ever, that policy cannot decide all cases, because the Court as-
sumes that lost wages recovered in car crashes are excludable.91
Yet in Schleier the Court apparently shared the fundamental de-
sire to distinguish lost wages in car crashes from lost wages in
employment discrimination. 2 The distinction used by the Tax
Court in 1975 in the first employment discrimination taxation
case, the absence of physical injury in employment discrimina-
tion,9 3 was not available to the Court because Burke had re-
jected it over the strong objection of Justice Scalia.94 The Court
failed to employ another possible distinction which had been de-
veloped by the D.C. Circuit in Sparrow v. Commissioner.95 Aris-
ing from the ancient distinction between damages and equitable
relief, the D.C. Circuit distinction found that lost wages recov-
ered in an employment discrimination claim were taxable equi-
table relief, rather than damages recovered in a common-law
tort.
96
By removing itself from the tether of the purported tax pol-
icy of §104(a)(2) and by abandoning the distinction between
physical and nonphysical injuries, 97 the Court used concepts of
causation to distinguish between lost wages in car crashes and
employment discrimination. In Schleier the Court found that
neither ADEA lost wages nor ADEA liquidated damages (in an
amount equal to lost wages when the violation was wilful) were
caused by a personal injury. The lost wages were caused either
THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 43 (8th ed. 1997).
89. See supra note 71.
90. See supra Part II.
91. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 329-30.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 48.
95. 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
96. Id. at 437-38.
97. Ultimately, Congress, not constrained by precedent, adopted the distinction be-
tween physical and nonphysical injuries. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996).
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by the victim's "being fired" or his "attaining the age of 60."98
The cause of the liquidated damages was discerned from the
congressional purpose in enacting the ADEA, which disclosed
that (1) those damages exist to punish the defendant, and (2) to
the extent that they remedy rather than punish, they compen-
sate for injuries that are "personal rather than economic."99
In Schleier, and more forcefully in O'Gilvie,100 the Court con-
cluded that damages caused by a desire to punish the defendant
are not on account of personal injury.10 ' In drawing that conclu-
sion the Court returned to the purported human capital restora-
tion tax policy.10 2 Fully admitting that "from the perspective of
tax policy one might argue that noncompensatory punitive dam-
ages and, for example, compensatory lost wages are much the
same thing," the Court decided nonetheless that, under the stat-
ute, they are not the same thing.103 Punitive damages are not
excluded, but lost wages are. Quite obviously then, the pur-
ported tax policy is just that, purported, since it cannot decide
the boundary cases. Further, neither in Schleier nor O'Gilvie
does the Court tell us how lost wages in car crashes are ex-
cluded while lost wages in discriminatory firing cases are not.
We are left with ad hoc decisions which designate when the pur-
ported tax policy is applied and when it is not. The reason why
the policy is applicable to punitive damages and lost wages in
discriminatory firing cases, but is not applicable to lost wages in
car crashes is not discussed.
Trying to extract a rule of general application from Schleier
(or O'Gilvie) is difficult, and most courts have read Schleier not
to state a general rule. The Tax Court, as well as the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, have read Schleier extremely narrowly, as a rule
limited to discriminatory firing cases. 0 4 The Tenth Circuit ap-
98. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330.
99. Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 331 (1995). See John W. Dostert, Note,
Commissioner v. Schleier: Adding Insult to "Personal Injury.", 74 N.C. L. Rav. 1641,
1676-77 (1996) ('That is, punitive damages do not bear the direct causal link with the
victim's personal injury required by Schleier, since the amount of punitive damages
awarded generally co-varies positively with the degree of the tortfeasor's conduct, not
with the extent of the injury sustained.").
100. O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 452 (1996).
101. Id. at 455.
102. Id. at 456.
103. Id. at 456.
104. Banks v. United States, 81 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 1996); Brabson v. United States,
73 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 607 (1996); Kovacs v. Commis-
sioner, 100 T.C. 124 (1993), affd, 25 F.3d 1048 (6th Cir. 1994).
In Taxation of Damages After Schleier-Where Are We and Where Do We Go From
Here, 15 QuuNNIPic L. REv. 305 (1995), when considering post-Schleier, pre-1996 Act
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plied Schleier more broadly in Brabson v. United States, finding
that the requirement of a direct link between the personal in-
jury and the loss of wages extends beyond discriminatory firing
cases.
0 5
The issue addressed by the Tenth Circuit in Brabson v.
United States was whether prejudgment interest awarded in a
physical injury case was excluded from taxation under
§ 104(a)(2). 10 6 Unlike postjudgment interest, which accrues from
the date of judgment, prejudgment interest is a statutory right
to interest on judgments measured from some date prior to
judgment, such as the date when the action accrued or when the
suit was filed. 10 7 Because claims are litigated for years, the
amount of prejudgment interest can exceed the amount of other
damages. Prior to Schleier, the Tax Court held that prejudgment
interest was not excludable under § 104(a)(2) because "interest"
is not "damages" 08 In Brabson, the Tenth Circuit agreed that
prejudgment interest is not excludable, but disagreed with the
Tax Court's reasoning. Rejecting the focus on labels, Brabson in-
stead focused on "substance over form" and identified the nature
of the prejudgment interest in Brabson as compensation of a vic-
tim for the lost time value of money. As such, the court con-
cluded that "though [prejudgment interest] is related to the in-
jury, both in terms of existence and computation, the award of
prejudgment interest is not linked to the injury in the same di-
rect way as traditional tort remedies,"0 9 because time is the rel-
evant factor, rather than the injury itself."0 Due to this "break"
in causation, the Tenth Circuit found that prejudgment interest
did not satisfy the Schleier requirement that there be a "direct
law, Professor Douglas A. Kahn concluded that lost wages would be excludable in physi-
cal injury cases, defamation cases and sexual harassment cases, but taxable in discrimi-
nation cases and in wrongful discharge cases. Consequently, I interpret Kahn as agree-
ing with the Ninth and Fifth Circuits' limitation of Schleier to discriminatory firing
cases. The only distinction between physical injury cases, defamation cases and sexual
harassment cases on the one hand, and discrimination cases and wrongful discharge
cases on the other, is that a "firing" occurs in the latter. Thus, the only cases in which
lost wages are excluded are those in which the victim is fired, for only then do we have
the convenient expedient of attributing cause to the firing rather than to the tort. Con-
sequently, it is hard to read Schleier as announcing a principle of more general
application.
105. 73 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 607 (1996).
106. Id. at 1044.
107. See generally id. at 1044.
108. Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 124 (1993), aff'd, 25 F.3d 1048 (6th Cir.
1994).




link between the injury and the remedial relief.""
In Brabson, as in Schleier, the court made a naked conclu-
sion that the causal chain between personal injury and remedy
was interrupted. In Schleier, either the "firing" or Schleier's
60th birthday, which was the reason United Airlines fired him
pursuant to its illegal mandatory retirement policy, was the in-
terrupting element,"2 while in Brabson the passage of time in-
terrupted the causal chain."3 The passage of time severed the
link to Brabson's antecedent physical personal injury from
which both the tort claim arose and the attendant right to pre-
judgment interest arose. But Brabson does not articulate a prin-
ciple of general application since various damages, including lost
wages, can be caused by the passage of time. Lost wages are
created when an injury prevents a victim from working for a
time while prejudgment interest is created when an injury pre-
vents a victim from employing the damaged capital for a time.
Three other courts which decided pre-1996 § 104(a)(2) cases
limited Schleier to discriminatory firing cases." 4 In Banks v.
United States'11 a Bethlehem Steel employee recovered damages
from his union because they permitted him to be fired." 6 Al-
though it involved firing, Banks was not a discriminatory firing
case, because Banks's employer did not fire him for a discrimi-
natory reason. Bethlehem Steel fired Banks because it mistak-
enly thought that Banks had initiated a fight with another em-
ployee. Proper representation by Banks's union would have
brought the error to the employer's attention and prevented
Banks's termination. Damages of $134,532 were assessed
against the union, an estimate of Banks's past and future
111. Id.
112. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330.
113. Brabson, 73 F.3d at 1044.
114. Knevelbaard v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 161 (1997); Dotson v. United
States, 87 F.3d 682 (5th Cir 1996); Banks v. United States, 81 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 1996).
115. 81 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 1996).
116. Bethlehem Steel fired Banks for fighting with a fellow employee. Id. at 874-75.
The union grieved the termination and engineered a settlement in which Banks and the
other employee quit and were paid $3000. Id. at 875. Banks vehemently objected, main-
taining that he was the victim of another's aggression, and disputing the union's policy
of not calling an employee to testify against another employee. Id. Banks sued Bethle-
hem Steel for racial discrimination, while also suing the union for breach of the duty of
fair representation. Id. Though Bethlehem Steel won summary judgment, the district
court held the union liable because Banks "was not discharged for just cause" and
"would have been reinstated after an arbitration." Id. at 875. Moreover, the district court
held that Banks had been prejudiced by the union's policy regarding employee witnesses




wages. In the tax case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the re-
covery from the union was entirely excludable from income, rea-
soning as follows:
Schleier, however, was determined by the specific limitations of the
ADEA and has no application here where neither punitive damages nor
back wages were offered in the settlement. Unions do not pay wages to
their members, and what the Union paid in settlement here to Banks did
not constitute wages. It paid damages to compensate for its unfair and
arbitrary treatment of Banks, conduct that the court had found to be in
bad faith and in violation of the Union's duty to fairly represent Banks.
We look to the nature of the injuries that were being compensated.
Banks' injuries were, as the district court found, personal injuries. Con-
sequently, the settlement was of a tort-like cause of action and the sum
paid was on account of personal injuries and by statute excluded from
gross income." 7
Judge Rymer, dissenting in Banks, read Schleier to extend
beyond discriminatory firing cases.
In this case, the parties agreed that Banks suffered a non-physical, per-
sonal injury. However, so far as I can tell, there is no indication that
Banks's lost wages resulted from being out of work because of his intan-
gible injuries. Thus, even though the Union's breach of duty may have
caused intangible personal injury, that injury did not cause Banks to lose
wages. He lost wages because he was discharged, and because the Union
failed to grieve; the personal injury did not affect the amount of back
wages recovered. As I read Schleier, the two must be linked in order for
a recovery of lost wages to be "on account of" personal injury.118
The answer for this causation question depends upon what
point in the chain of causation is examined. At the terminal link
of the chain, both Schleier's and Banks's lost wages resulted
from "being fired."119 The reason neither could appear at his
workplace was because he had been fired, and the cases are not
distinguishable. Stepping back along the chain of causation, the
cases are distinguishable, because Schleier's firing was due to
the tortious conduct of his employer in committing age discrimi-
nation,120 while Banks's firing was due to the tortious conduct of
117. Id. at 876 (citation omitted).
118. Id. at 877 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
119. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 325 (using the passive voice to describe the firing); Banks,
81 F.3d at 874-75.
120. In fact, the Supreme Court in Schleier held that the ADEA was not tort-like
under the first prong (Burke prong) of § 104(a)(2); consequently the conduct of Schleier's
employers was not tortious in the § 104(a)(2) sense. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 334. How-
ever, the Court did continue to announce the second prong, the Schleier causation prong,
without confronting the point that its creation was unnecessary to decide the case. Id. at
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another, specifically his union's malpractice in permitting his
firing.121 In Banks, the majority and dissenting opinions focus on
different segments of the causal chain. The Banks dissent fo-
cuses on the terminal link and fails to distinguish Schleier,
since both Banks and Schleier were fired.12 2 By contrast, the
Banks majority focuses on determining what party caused the
injury, thus distinguishing Schleier by stating that "[u]nions do
not pay wages to their members." 2 3
In 1997, the Tax Court cited Banks when it limited Schleier
to discriminatory firing cases. In Knevelbaard v. Commissioner,
defendant financial institutions negligently permitted Knudsen
Dairy to continue business operations although the Dairy did
not pay for the milk it received during a one month period. 2"
The Dairy's continued operation caused plaintiff dairy farmers
who had entered into supply contracts with the Dairy to suffer
emotional distress. The Tax Court described the resultant emo-
tional distress as follows:
When Knudsen defaulted, petitioners could not simply stop produc-
ing milk. Cows had to be milked and fed. Farmhands had to be paid.
Grain had to be purchased. The farmers were operating on very slim
profit margins. They faced the possibility of slaughtering their herds or
pouring the milk onto the ground. For years (in some cases for more
than one generation) they had relied on the regularity of the milk pay-
ments. Unexpectedly, they were faced with borrowing money, depleting
their savings, and possible bankruptcy.
The uncertainty of their situation produced enormous stress, which
did not end on July 15, 1986. The financial problems caused by losing
payment for 4 weeks' worth of milk persisted, because the loss was not
repaid. Even when Knudsen began making daily payments, there was no
guarantee that the money would be there from one day to the next. Peti-
tioners had to rearrange their lives so they could be personally present
when the milk was picked up, in order to see the money before they re-
leased the milk. The situation did not stabilize for months.1u
The plaintiff dairy farmers in Knevelbaard were among one
thousand milk producers who filed a twelve count complaint al-
leging fraud, misrepresentation, interference with contract and
336. Thus, in considering the Schleier prong, we necessarily put aside the question of
whether the cause of action is tort-like, because that is encompassed in the Burke prong.
121. See Banks, 81 F.3d at 875.
122. See Banks, 81 F.3d at 876; Schleier, 515 U.S. at 325.
123. Banks, 81 F.3d at 876.
124. 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 161 (1997).
125. See id. at 162-63.
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negligent infliction of emotional distress. 26 The case settled and
nearly all of the settlement proceeds were allocated to the emo-
tional distress claim. 27 The value of the milk not paid for by
Knudsen Dairy was thirty million dollars, and the defendant fi-
nancial institutions paid a twenty million dollar settlement. 12
The settlement proceeds appeared to be distributed among
plaintiffs' class in shares approximately proportionate to milk
payments owed them by Knudsen Dairy. 29
When the Tax Court excluded these settlement payments
from income, it noted three relevant points. First, the plaintiffs'
claims against the defendant financial institutions were sepa-
rate and apart from their claims against Knudsen Dairy.130 Al-
though the plaintiffs undoubtedly suffered emotional harm at
Knudsen Diary's hands from the default itself, the plaintiffs al-
leged additional and separate harm due to the defendant finan-
cial institutions' act of improperly financing the Dairy's contin-
ued operation.' 3' Second, depositions and answers to
interrogatories by plaintiff class members disclosed "specific
emotional harm," although no evidence of expenses for medical
or psychiatric care existed. 32 Third, although the damages were
proportionate to defaulted milk payments, that did not mean'
that they were not received for emotional distress, as awards for
personal injury may be measured by lost income and still be ex-
cluded under § 104(a)(2). 133 The court, citing Banks, summed up
its case by declaring "banks don't buy milk."3 4
A Fifth Circuit decision about the tax consequences of a set-
tlement of class action ERISA litigation with Continental Can
presented interesting questions about the retroactivity of Su-
preme Court decisions and application of § 104(a)(2). 135 In the
ERISA case, former employees of Continental Can alleged that
it fired them to avoid pension liability.3 6 At the time of that
suit, it was not clear whether ERISA provided only equitable
rights and remedies, or whether it also provided tort-type rights
126. See id. at 163.
127. See id. at 165.
128. See id. at 162, 165.
129. See id. at 166.
130. See id. at 163.
131. See id. at 168.
132. Id. at 168.
133. See id. at 169.
134. Id. at 168 n.8.
135. See Dotson v. United States, 87 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 1996).
136. See id. at 684.
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such as compensatory and punitive damages.137 The ERISA case
settled under supervision of a special master, who resolved the
question in favor of a broader measure of damages and awarded
plaintiffs damages for non-pecuniary losses including impair-
ment of earnings ability, mental anguish, emotional distress and
dignitary loss. 138 Though the Supreme Court later decided in
Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc.139 that ERISA did not permit recovery
of tort-type damages but authorized only equitable relief, the
Continental Can settlement had been completed by that time.140
Because Continental Can had withheld wages and income
taxes from the settlement payments, some members of the class
sought refunds of tax in federal district courts.' 4 ' In the first tax
case decided, the District Court for the Southern District of
Texas held that the Burke prong of § 104(a)(2) was not met, be-
cause the narrow scope of remedies under ERISA, as construed
by the Supreme Court in Mertens, makes the ERISA claim non-
tort-like. 42 The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding
that the Burke prong should have been evaluated on the basis of
the substantive ERISA law when the settlement was reached.
"The characterization of damages received is not affected by the
shifting sands of statutory interpretation after a bona fide set-
tlement has been reached or a damage award rendered."43
Holding that the Burke prong was satisfied, the Fifth Cir-
cuit next addressed the Schleier prong, and determined that the
settlement had compensated plaintiffs for both (1) "the stress,
the stigma and the self-doubt that comes with losing a well-paid
job," and (2) lost wages. 44 The court held the damages for
stress, stigma and self-doubt excludable, but the lost wages
were denied exclusion. According to the court, Schleier "man-
dates different treatment of back wages received pursuant to a
discriminatory firing case.... The personal injuries themselves,
as the Supreme Court distinguishes them, did not give rise to
the loss of wages."145 The court remanded for the district court to
determine the amount of back wages. The Dotson court thereby
read Schleier in the most narrow sense by construing the rule to
apply only to back wages in discriminatory firing cases, for it
137. Id. at 686.
138. See id. at 688.
139. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
140. See Dotson, 87 F.3d at 686.
141. See id. at 689.
142. See id. at 684.
143. See id. at 686.




did not apply the causal requirement to any of the other ele-
ments of damage recovered: impairment of earnings ability,
mental anguish, emotional distress or dignitary loss.
A dissent in Dotson146 asserted that the Burke prong had
not been met because Mertens had to "be given full retroactive
effect in all cases still open on direct review as to all events re-
gardless of whether such events predate or postdate our an-
nouncement of the rule."147 Later, the Fourth Circuit1 48 agreed
with the Dotson dissent, as did a federal district court in
Ohio.14 9 By deciding on the Burke prong, those cases obviated
consideration of the Schleier prong.
IV. POST-SCHLEIER, POST-1996 ACT-MoRE QUESTIONS OF
CAUSATION
Deciding whether Schleier articulates a causation require-
ment of general application or is a decision limited to lost wages
in a discriminatory firing case remains a point of indeterminacy
after the 1996 Act, for neither the 1996 Act nor its legislative
history settle the tax policy underlying § 104(a)(2). The Act au-
thoritatively denies exclusion for lost wages in nonphysical in-
jury cases, 150 but the announced reason for the rule, like the
court cases adopting the distinction under "old!' law, offers no
principle for the distinction.
We are told that lost wages and lost profits are taxable in
nonphysical injury cases because they "would otherwise be in-
cluded in taxable income," 15 but so would lost wages and lost
profits in physical injury cases. Is the unstated reason that we
offer our kindness only to victims of physical tortious injury, or
should we read the legislative history as fully consistent with
the human capital restoration theory, thereby making taxable
all substitutes for taxable income? That is, how should we read
the 1996 Act's silence as to physical injury lost wages? Under
the 1996 Act, are physical injury lost wages taxable under a
pure human capital restoration policy, or does the impure the-
ory continue to exclude physical injury lost wages owing to kind-
ness to physical injury victims? 152
146. Id. at 690-94.
147. Id.
148. Hemelt v. United States, 122 F.3d 204, 208 (4th Cir. 1997), afflg 957 F. Supp.
562 (D. Md. 1996) (citation omitted).
149. Gerbec v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 122 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
150. See supra note 86.
151. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
152. This interpretative indeterminacy rekindles a debate following a 1989 amend-
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For instance, suppose a workplace is sexually hostile be-
cause of words, gestures and pictures. Further, suppose that the
victim of the sexual harassment sensibly absents herself from a
workplace in -which she is sexually harassed and recovers: (1)
damages for lost wages; (2) damages for emotional distress due
to the humiliation and stigmatization attendant to harassment;
and (3) punitive damages. None of the three types of damages is
excludable. Express language of the 1996 Act (and the O'Gilvie
decision for pre-1996 Act cases) denies exclusion of the punitive
damages. 153 Lost wages and compensatory damages for emo-
tional distress are denied exclusion, because there is no physical
injury.1 54
Suppose we have an offensive touching in addition to a sex-
ually hostile workplace; is there a physical injury? Several pos-
sibilities exist. Is any offensive touching a physical injury for
these purposes, or must there be (1) some physical manifesta-
tion of injury, like a bruise or a breaking of the skin, (2) some
injury requiring medical care, or (3) a period of convalescence?
The 1996 Act's legislative history provides:
If an action has its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness, then
all damages (other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom are
treated as payments received on account of physical injury or physical
sickness whether or not the recipient of the damages is the injured party.
For example, damages, other than punitive damages, received by an indi-
vidual on account of a claim for loss of consortium due to the physical in-
jury or physical sickness of such individual's spouse are excludable from
ment to § 104(a)(2), which provided that the exclusion "shall not apply to any punitive
damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness!'
I.R.C. § 104 note (1994) (Amendments). The 1989 amendment thereby expressly removed
punitive damages from the § 104(a)(2) exclusion when those damages were recovered in
a post-1989 case that did not involve physical injury or physical sickness. Courts, how-
ever, disagreed on the state of pre-amendment law, which the Supreme Court did not re-
solve until O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 452 (1996). Prior to O'Gilvie, there was
debate as to whether the 1989 amendment's exclusion from the § 104(a)(2) exclusion of
post-1989 punitive damages that were not connected to physical injury or physical sick-
ness implied that post-1989 punitive damages that were connected to physical sickness
were included in the exclusion. The question was whether the 1989 amendment had
both an "inclusionary component" as well as an "exclusionary component." See generally
Kahn, supra note 18, at 367. Similarly, we might ask whether the fact that the 1996 Act
excludes lost wages in nonphysical injury cases from the exclusion on human capital the-
ory grounds might then imply an inclusion in the exclusion for lost wages in physical in-
jury cases.
153. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996) (referring to those damages "other than puni-
tive damages").
154. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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gross income. 5'
Suppose we have a physical injury, we now must face the
causation question. From Schleier, it appears that we focus on
the reason why the victim absented herself from the workplace.
Schleier's reason for not appearing at the workplace was that he
was fired, and being fired is not a personal injury;156 even if one
is fired for an impermissible reason like age discrimination, this
is an immaculate firing.157 However, if a car crash victim suffers
a broken leg which prevents her from going to work, her reason
for not appearing at the workplace is a personal injury. Again,
this merely restates the opinion of the Schleier Court that the
firing interrupted the causal consequences following from the
antecedent discriminatory act, and the Schleier rule must still
be applied.158
Why is our hypothetical sexual harassment victim who also
suffered an offensive touching not appearing at the workplace?
Suppose it is because of the humiliation of a sexually hostile
work environment. Do we say that humiliation and emotional
distress are a closer cause of the not-appearing and, since by
statute emotional distress is not a physical injury, 15 9 lost wages
are not excluded from taxation? Or, does the presence of any
physical injury mean that all damages are excluded? That is, is
the physical injury requirement a Burke-type requirement
where all damages are excludable once present, or a Schleier-
type requirement where we must decide whether each element
of damages is caused by physical injury? The 1996 Act legisla-
tive history suggests that the physical injury requirement is a
Burke-type requirement, as it expressly provides that a spousal
loss of consortium recovery by the spouse who is not physically
injured nonetheless flows from the physical injury of the physi-
155. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1677, 1793.
156. Schiler, 515 US. at 330.
157. Leading Cases, 109 HARv. L. REv. 111, 324 n.1633 (1995).
The text of the opinion suggests that the Court focused on the fact that termi-
nation, lawful or otherwise, automatically implies a loss of wages. If the injury
itself consists of lost wages, then the injury cannot independently cause lost
wages. Apart from this hint, however, the Court unfortunately leaves the
reader to speculate about why being fired because of one's age is not a personal
injury.
Id. See also Manns, supra note 48, at 123.
158. See Manns, supra note 48, at 125-27.
159. I.R.C. § 104(a) (Supp. II 1996) ("For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional dis-




If the physical injury requirement is a Burke-type require-
ment, then the definition of physical injury will decide our hypo-
thetical. The determinative question will be the factual extent of
the victim's injury measured against the legal extent of injury
contained in the physical injury requirement.
If the physical injury requirement is a Schleier-type require-
ment, then the physical injury will have to meet the legal test of
"physical injury" and, in addition, be regarded as the cause of
damages in the Schleier sense. Suppose the reason that the sex-
ual harassment victim absented herself from the workplace was
an offensive touching that did not give rise to any physical man-
ifestation of injury. For instance, imagine that the victim who
endured an environment which was sexually hostile because of
words, pictures and gestures decided she could no longer bear
such environment when someone grabbed her;16' did that physi-
cal injury cause the loss of wages? To answer this question, we
must confront whether the Schleier prong applies to the new
physical injury requirement and determine how it would fit
within a theory that explains the application of § 104(a)(2).
V. DEVELOPING A THEORY THAT EXPLAINS =H CASES
The purported tax policy of tax-free human capital restora-
tion, as applied by the Service and implied by the courts, fails of
its essential purpose to explain the results of cases. The Service,
as tax administrator, has applied an exclusion for all lost wages
in physical injury cases by not litigating the exclusion. 62 The
Supreme Court has admitted, or perhaps assumed, the anoma-
lous exclusion of lost wages in car crash cases. Two principled
solutions present themselves: (1) conform the results with the
theory (that is, change the result in the boundary cases), or (2)
develop a coherent theory to explain the boundary cases.
160. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
161. A preview of the Supreme Court case of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ser-
vices, 188 S.Ct. 998 (1998), noted that "[o]ther cases have arisen in workplaces where
crude sexual jokes and grabbing of co-workers is surprisingly common." David D. Savage,
Workplace Bias to the Fore, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 40, 42.
162. Compare Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32 with Rev. Rul. 61-1, 1961-1 C.B. 14,
and Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50.
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A. A Pure Policy of Tax-Free Human Capital Restoration
Divining a pure policy, pure in the sense of tax neutrality,
for tax-free human capital restoration has been attempted in the
literature, but not the courts. The Supreme Court recognizes an
"anomaly," but has not tried to fix it. Consequently, the follow-
ing is of academic interest only except in the unlikely, but possi-
ble, event the Court retreats from its car crash counter-example
in Schleier.1 3
Tax neutrality starts with the major premise that recoveries
for things not taxed, like spousal consortium, enjoyment of life
or freedom from pain and suffering, should not be taxed once
they are lost; but recoveries for things that would have been
taxed absent the accident, like future earnings, should be taxed.
Conforming a theory to that premise becomes difficult because
the tort law, which generates the damages, usually is indifferent
to such distinction.'6
For most of the history of the exclusion, we can surmise
that a majority of tort victims were victims of physical injury
and recovered undifferentiated verdicts or settlements. The§ 104(a)(2) exclusion applied to the entire recovery from a com-
bination of administrative convenience (in not wanting either to
differentiate damages or to calculate basis in human capital)
and kindness to the victims of physical injury. But as Part II
shows, with the increased frequency of dignitary torts, particu-
larly employment discrimination, courts wanted to treat those
recoveries differently from car crashes, although both were per-
sonal injury torts and both gave rise to recoveries of things that
would have been taxable had the tort not occurred. 165 Commen-
tators shared the desire to distinguish employment discrimina-
tion and car crashes but, unlike the courts, sought theoretical
justification.
Professor Stephan suggested that, from a theoretical per-
spective, earnings replacement damages should be bifurcated
into those affecting (1) ability to earn, and (2) ability to enjoy,
with the former taxable and the latter not. He would create a
rule of thumb that recoveries for injuries affecting work expec-
163. "On rare occasions, however, the Supreme Court has spurned glosses of similar
venerability in favor of rules that conform more closely to a tax on net economic income"
Stephan, supra note 12, at 1416.
164. See Stephan, supra note 12, at 1413. Yet, while tort victims often recover un-
differentiated amounts not allocated among different elements of damage, that did not
stop the Supreme Court in Schleier from adopting a causation rule entirely dependent
upon separate consideration of each element of damages.
165. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
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tancy would be taxable and recoveries for injuries affecting life
expectancy would not.166 From a pragmatic perspective, Stephan
noted favorably that the physical/nonphysical distinction under
pre-1996 law, which had not been that negated by the Supreme
Court, approximated his theoretical rule that damages to en-
dowment human capital, existing in all persons from birth, are
not taxable, while damages to personalized human capital, cre-
ated by lifetime changes like education and training, are taxa-
ble.167 Stephan criticized the personal/business distinction, the
nascent form of the economic injuries argument more forcefully
developed in employment discrimination cases after Stephan
wrote, as utterly devoid of rationality because it turned on
things like pleading rules.168
Professor Kahn argued that the exclusion of lost wages is
not necessarily inconsistent with a human capital theory.169 In
physical injury cases, lost wages are used to estimate the overall
quantum of the injury, rather than serving solely to replace in-
come that would have been earned because few other devices ex-
ist which can be used to quantify the injury, and the precision
of lost income's mathematical attributes lends respectability to
the estimation. Thus, in the parlance of the tort lawyer, lost
wages are used as one of many factors to arrive at a general
damages amount, rather than being recovered as special dam-
ages in actual substitution for lost income. 70 That theoretical
justification, coupled with administrative convenience in not
having to allocate verdicts and settlements, leads Kahn to ex-
clude lost wages recoveries in all physical injury cases.' 7'
For nonphysical injury cases, Kahn argues, the theoretical
justification fades because nonphysical injuries are more closely
identified with commercial ventures, so there is "less justifica-
tion to treat them as lying beyond the commercial sphere of the
income tax system" and apparently more reason to believe that
they are recovered as special damages rather than general dam-
166. See Stephan, supra note 12, at 1389-91, 1397.
167. Id. at 1413.
168. Id. at 1414-15.
169. See Kahn, supra note 18, at 344-45, 352-53.
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 904 (1979) (distinguishing general and spe-
cial damages: "general damages" are compensatory damages for a harm so frequently re-
sulting from the tort that is the basis of the action that the existence of the damages is
normally to be anticipated and hence need not be alleged in order to be proved; "special
damages" are compensatory damages for a harm other than one for which general dam-
ages are given).
171. See Kahn, supra note 18, at 355.
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ages. 172 Consequently, Kahn endorsed the physical/nonphysical
distinction as a workable substitute for his preferred distinction
of injuries associated primarily with commercial activities and
those associated primarily with noncommercial activities, be-
cause of the administrative problems in applying a commercial/
noncommercial distinction.173
Professor Kahn's physical/nonphysical approach essentially
was adopted by Congress in the 1996 Act,174 but now that the
physical injury requirement has been codified, it is appropriate
to focus on the anomalous exclusion of lost wages in physical in-
jury cases and decide how a tax neutral policy of human capital
restoration would treat such lost wages. Kahn argues that the
human capital theory neither supports nor opposes exclusion of
lost wages in physical injury cases. 75 However, the theoretical
support for excluding them is based upon the independent justi-
fications of (1) normal use of lost wages in physical injury cases
as general damages, rather than as special damages, and (2) ad-
ministrative convenience. 176
It appears that the two justifications collapse into one of ad-
ministrative convenience. Kahn agrees that lost wages in physi-
cal injury cases should be taxable when the lost wages damages
are identified separately. Kahn nonetheless rejects that excep-
tion to the general rule of exclusion for physical injury cases, be-
cause victims should not be taxed on the happenstance of
whether their lost wages were identified separately in a settle-
ment or judgment. If they were, only the unwary would permit
such an identification. 7 7 That overvalues administrative conve-
nience, particularly in light of the Supreme Court decision in
O'Gilvie which devalued administrative convenience as an ex-
172. Id. at 357.
173. The administrative problems with that distinction are chronicled in the Tax
Court's short-lived attempt to distinguish commercial and noncommercial libel, which
Stephan aptly called "devoid of underlying rationality.! Stephan, supra note 12, at 1414.
Two years after Stephan wrote his article, the Tax Court abandoned its attempt to dis-
tinguish personal and professional reputation. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294,
1301 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
174. See supra note 7.
175. See Kahn, supra note 18, at 344-45.
176. See Kahn, supra note 18, at 353-55.
177. Id. Nonetheless, the Service applies such a rule in a related context. In Reve-
nue Ruling 75-232, 1975-1 C.B. 94, the Service concluded that the portion of an excluda-
ble personal injury settlement specifically allocated to future medical expenses offsets,
and thereby denies a medical expense deduction for future medical expenses. Had the
medical expenses not been allocated, all future medical expenses would be deductible as
such. Niles v. United States, 710 E2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1983).
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ception to pure tax theory in § 104(a)(2) cases. 178 In Schleier, the
Court adopted a damages-focused element-by-element test of
causation, without regard to how difficult the allocation ques-
tions would be when employment discrimination victims recov-
ered undifferentiated judgments or settlements.17 9 Indeed, even
if it hadn't been rejected by the Court, administrative conve-
nience is not served by blanket rules in damages taxation cases;
allocation issues are endemic to the law of damages taxation.
Litigants rarely assert solely one claim or one element of dam-
ages, and the "in-lieu-of" test itself is a damages-element-
focused test.
Thus, it appears that administrative convenience does not
overcome the need to consider normatively the recovery of lost
wages within the human capital theory. I argue that under the
pure form of the human capital restoration policy, consideration
of the heretofore unitary consideration of qost wages" calls for a
sharp distinction between damages for impaired earning capac-
ity and damages for lost wages for convalescent time. The for-
mer should be treated as recovery of principal and the latter as
a taxable current income. Distinguishing impaired earning ca-
pacity and convalescent lost wages provides three benefits: it (1)
places the human capital restoration theory within the larger
principal/income framework of tax law; (2) makes the accident
tax neutral; and (3) mirrors a damages allocation sourced in the
substantive tort law.
1. Reconciling Human Capital Restoration Theory and the
Principal/Income Framework. The human capital restoration
theory, and indeed much of income taxation, is based on the effi-
cacy of distinguishing income from principal.180 Earning capacity
is considered principal because it is a store of value from which
178. O'Gilvie, 117 S.Ct. at 457 (arguing that even if administrative convenience ex-
plains the anomalous exclusion of lost wages by not requiring an allocation among the
compensatory elements of a settlement, the administrative convenience of not having to
distinguish punitive from compensatory damages does not trump the tax theoretical
need to treat punitive damages as outside the § 104(a)(2) exclusion because they do not
restore a loss).
179. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330.
180. The principal/income distinction itself is artificial, for principal merely is the
net present value of the income expected to be generated in the future. For instance, ap-
ple trees are principal and apple crops are income, yet the apple tree's value is simply
the sum of value of expected future apple crops, discounted at an interest rate. Nonethe-
less, the income tax system (particularly in its regimes of capital gains and basic recov-
ery) and the human capital theory depend upon maintaining the distinction.
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income periodically issues, as apples issue from apple trees.181
When principal (sometimes called a "capital asset" in tax par-
lance) is converted into cash, taxable income results unless the
amount of cash is less than the adjusted tax basis in the princi-
pal. 8 2 Thus, when human capital is converted into a damages
payment and the "in-lieu-of' test is applied, taxable income re-
sults unless the basis in human capital is greater than the
amount of damages recovered. It is extremely difficult to calcu-
late adjusted basis in human capital;183 distinguishing between
impaired earning capacity and convalescent lost wages would
obviate this problematic basis calculation. If the lost wages are
for convalescence, they are entirely includible in income without
basis recovery, as is the case for all taxable wages, while if the
lost wages are for impaired earning capacity, they are excluda-
ble from income (without need to calculate basis or basis carry-
overs).
2. Creating Tax Neutrality. Distinguishing between im-
paired earning capacity and convalescent lost wages places the
victim status quo ante tax-wise while making the accident a tax
neutral event. Prior to the accident, the victim owned her earn-
ing capacity worth X (although prior to the accident there had
been no need to calculate its worth), and expected to employ
that earning capacity in the labor markets to generate current
labor income. Following the accident and damages recovery, she
can employ the now monetized capital of X in the financial mar-
kets to earn current financial income. The income streams, labor
and financial, are equal because tort law, which generates the
damages amount, calculates X in a manner to make them
equal.184
We can analogize to apples and apple trees. If a tortfeasor
illegally harvests and keeps an orchardist's crop, the orchardist
has suffered a loss of income; damages paid are "in-lieu-of" cur-
181. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (holding unconstitutional the taxation
of a stock dividend as income).
The fundamental relation of "capital" to "income" has been much discussed by
economists, the former being likened to the tree or the land, the latter to the
fruit or the crop; the former depicted as a reservoir supplied from springs, the
latter as the outlet stream, to be measured by its flow during a period of time.
Id. at 206.
182. I.R.C. § 1001 (1994).
183. Kahn, supra note 18, at 344 (explaining that the possibility that an individual
might have a basis in personal rights is remote, but even if theoretically justified,
problems in determining the amount are "mind-boggling.).
184. RESTATEMET (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 913A, 924 cmts. c, d (1979).
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rent income and are taxable in full. If a tortfeasor cuts down the
trees in the orchard, the orchardist suffers a loss of principal.
Under the "in-lieu-of" test and the broad sweep of the definition
of income, the orchardist has income to the extent the damages
recovery exceeds his basis in the apple trees. Yet, an exclusion
exists in § 1033 to permit the orchardist to replace his trees tax-
free.18 5 Absent the exclusion, the orchardist might not have
enough capital to replace all his trees; he would be short by the
amount of the tax. Section 1033 permits the orchardist to take
the monetized value of his orchard, undiminished by taxes, and
completely replace his orchard, from which he will earn income
by selling apples in the future. Similarly, the § 104(a)(2) exclu-
sion attempts to permit an accident victim to substitute finan-
cial capital completely to replace her earning capacity capital,
from which she will earn an equal-and equally taxable-stream
of financial income.
Perfect tax neutrality between pre- and post-accident posi-
tions requires that the amount of damages, which is set by tort
law, be the arithmetic sum of future earnings not reduced for in-
come taxes discounted at a "reasonable rate."18 6 Neutrality re-
quires equality between the financial income stream and the la-
bor income it replaces. If, in calculating the lump-sum award,
the labor income stream is decreased for taxes, as sometimes is
done in tort law, then the resulting financial income stream will
be too small, because the financial income stream itself will still
be subject to tax. 8 7 Had the accident not occurred, the future la-
185. Section 1033 usually is called a deferral provision rather than an exclusion be-
cause it defers taxation on the damages recovery until the replaced trees are sold or ex-
changed. I.R.C. § 1033 (1994). Section 1033 uses a carry-over basis in the replacement
trees to ensure that taxation will occur at disposition of the replacement trees. But it is
an exclusion in the same sense as the § 104(a)(2) exclusion in that both permit the tax-
free restoration of tortiously damaged capital. The symmetry with § 104(a)(2) would be
complete if the personal injury victim took a carry-over basis in the damages payment.
That is, we would reassign the personal injury victim's basis in her destroyed human
capital as her basis in the damages recovery that restores the damaged human capital.
Because the damages recovery received by the victim is in the form of money, she is ac-
tually in a better position than the orchardist who receives new trees. When the or-
chardist disposes of his replacement trees, he will have to pay tax on the income he re-
ceives. However, the personal injury victim can dispose of her replacement principal tax-
free. This phenomenon occurs because one's basis in cash equals the face value of the
cash. Thus, carry-over basis in the damages payment would have to equal the damages
payment itself, and upon disposal of the replacement principal, the victim would receive
no income that exceeds her basis. The personal injury victim is therefore better off, be-
cause she can dispose of her replacement principal tax-free while the orchardist will pay
tax when he disposes of his replacement trees. See Dodge, supra note 18, at 155-60.
186. RESTATMEN (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 913A (1979).
187. Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59. (stating that "[ilncome realized from the in-
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bor earnings would have been taxable, but the future financial
return on the substitutionary financial capital will taxable as
well. Lastly, perfect neutrality requires that the substitutionary
financial capital be completely exhausted at the end of the vic-
tim's working life, as would her human capital would have been
had no accident occurred and she had worked. The use in tort
law of the economic concept of discounted cash flows ensures
that this will occur.188
But while tax neutrality requires exclusion for damages for
impaired earning capacity, it requires inclusion for convalescent
lost wages. Here, we would distinguish typical car crash victims
from surgeons who lose fingers. In a typical car crash, the vic-
tim suffers lost wages because of convalescence, but suffers no
impaired future income as her career earnings are not affected;
she stays out of work for some time, returns to her normal job,
and progresses through her career as she would have absent the
period of convalescence. By contrast, a surgeon who loses fingers
incurs impaired future earnings; she no longer can practice as a
surgeon and she loses her remaining income from a career in
surgery. The difference between her income from a surgeon's ca-
reer and what she can earn in mitigation, such as in another
medical specialty, is the measure of her impaired future earn-
ings. The surgeon thereby has suffered a destruction of human
capital, for it is human capital (her education and training as a
surgeon) that permits the earning of future income. Her acquisi-
tion of human capital when she acquired her medical education
and training was not taxed, for after she finished her training,
she was not taxed for being "richer" as a trained surgeon. Taxa-
tion awaits the returns from human capital, when the trained
surgeon earns fees. Similarly, if the surgeon "lost" human capi-
tal by deciding to stop working, she is not taxed for "consuming
vestment of a lump sum payment representing the discounted present value of a damage
award for personal injury is not excludable . . . ."). If the defendant pays the damages
periodically rather than as a lump sum, then the financial income stream, which is the
implicit interest portion of the periodic payments, escapes taxation to the victim under
the second parenthetical of § 104(a)(2). That is not anomalous to tax-neutrality, because
the defendant will be taxed on the interest income.
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 913A (1979).
The reduction process should be followed separately for each separate item of
future loss. It is complicated and may appropriately be explained by the utili-
zation of present-worth tables, indicating the present worth of a dollar, paid at
regular intervals over a designated period of time and calculated at a particu-
lar interest rate.
Id. Both a discounted cash flow model and an annuity model will produce streams of in-




her human capital," nor is she permitted a loss. Thus, normal
additions and deletions to the store of human capital are not
taxed.8 9 If we intend to limit § 104(a)(2)'s exclusion to tortiously
destroyed human capital, the exclusion for lost wages should be
limited to impaired future earnings. The loss of the capacity to
earn income is lost human capital. Though the current return
on human capital normally is taxed as income, lost wages for a
period of convalescence is a lost current return, and should not
be excluded under the human capital restoration policy.
3. Resembling Substantive Tort Law Damages Allocation.
Distinguishing impaired earning capacity and convalescent lost
wages for § 104(a)(2) purposes would of course raise allocation
issues, but allocation issues nearly always are raised in dam-
ages recovery cases, for litigants rarely assert a single claim or
single element of damages. Given that allocations must occur in
these cases on a near universal basis, this allocation between
damages for impaired earning capacity and damages for lost
wages for convalescent time is particularly easy to implement
because tort law, which generates the damages, already distin-
guishes between them. 90 Nevertheless, a theory distinguishing
impaired earning capacity and convalescent lost wages would re-
quire either statutory amendment or retreat by the Supreme
Court from dicta repeated in three recent cases.
No court has been presented the opportunity to distinguish
lost earning capacity and lost current wages.' 9 ' In fact, no court
has decided how to fit "lost wages" of either or both kinds in a
189. See Dodge, supra note 18, at 959.
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 cmt. e (1979).
A person physically harmed by the tort of another is entitled to receive as
damages the amount of earnings he has been prevented from acquiring up to
the time of the trial. This amount is the difference between what he probably
could have earned but for the harm and any lesser sum that he actually
earned in any employment or, if he failed to avail himself of opportunities, the
amount that he probably could have earned in work for which he was fitted, up
to the time of trial.
Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 cmt. d (1979).
The extent of future harm to the earning capacity of the injured person is mea-
sured by the difference, viewed as of the time of trial, between the value of the
plaintiff's services as they will be in view of the harm and as they would have
been had there been no harm. This difference is the resultant derived from re-
ducing to present value the anticipated losses of earnings during the expected
working period that the plaintiff would have had during the remainder of his
prospective life, but for the defendant's act.
RESTATmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 cmt. d (1979).
191. See generally Kahn, supra note 18, at 353-54; Dodge, supra note 18, at 165-66.
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physical injury case. Physical injury cases are not litigated; they
are discussed in case law only as contrasts to the nonphysical
injury cases at bar, as done in Schleier.
Assume that a taxpayer is in an automobile accident, is injured and
as a result of that injury suffers (1) medical expenses; (2) lost wages; and
(3) pain, suffering and emotional distress that cannot be measured with
precision. If the taxpayer settles a resulting lawsuit for $30,000 (and if
the taxpayer has not previously deducted her medical expenses, see
§ 104(a)), the entire $30,000 would be excludable under § 104(a)(2)....
[Tihe recovery for lost wages is also excludable as being "on account of
personal injuries," as long as the lost wages resulted from time in which
the taxpayer was out of work as a result of her injuries. See, e.g., Threl-
keld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1300, (1986) (hypothetical surgeon
who loses finger through tortious conduct may exclude any recovery for
lost wages because "[tihis injury ... will also undoubtedly cause special
damages including loss of future income"), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (CA6
1988).192
I argue that there is a difference between the hypothetical
surgeon in Threlkeld and the car crash victim in Schleier. While
the surgeon certainly suffered impaired future income, as the
Tax Court's hypothetical clearly demonstrated, the car crash vic-
tim in Schleier probably did not. It is of course possible that a
car crash victim could suffer impaired future income, for in-
stance if the driver was a surgeon who lost fingers, but car
crash victims normally do not suffer impaired future income.
The Schleier court's hypothetical did not limit its conclusion to
impaired future income, although the referenced hypothetical in
Threlkeld arguably did. Consequently, the door is open for the
Supreme Court to clarify its dicta in Schleier and limit the ex-
clusion to impaired future income. Given that the Schleier Court
abandoned the strong dicta of Burke,'193 it is conceivable that the
Court could hold that the 104(a)(2) exclusion limited to impaired
future income even in physical injury cases.
B. A Coherent Theory to Explain the Boundary Cases
Because neither the courts nor Congress (nor apparently
the Service) has distinguished convalescent lost wages from im-
paired future earnings, perhaps the exclusion really does rest
upon a policy other than the tax neutral restoration of human
capital. The boundary cases in applying § 104(a)(2) always occur
when the tort victim and tortfeasor have an economic relation-
192. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 329-30.
193. See supra note 66.
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ship prior to the arisal of the tort claim.194 This suggests that
the real tax policy underlying § 104(a)(2) is kindness to victims,
which dissipates when the victim and tortfeasor have a pre-
existing economic relationship.
Kindness dissipates because income taxation takes special
interest in the exchange of contract rights and strains to ensure
that exchanges of contract rights are not "hidden" as tort com-
pensation. 195 Here, tax law diverges from the substantive law of
contract and torts, for taxation demands the distinction, yet con-
tract and tort law converge. 196 While cases never articulate the
kindness rationale, or any other principled distinction to differ-
entiate why economic damages are excluded in one case but not
in another, we can observe that in nearly all circumstances
when "economic damages" are denied exclusion, the victim and
tortfeasor were "economically related."
197
With kindness to tort victims as the policy of § 104(a)(2), we
exclude all damages, except punitive damages, recovered by
physically injured victims when tortfeasor and victim are not ec-
onomically-related; but, when the victim and tortfeasor have a
pre-existing economic relationship, we apply the element-by-ele-
ment causation test of Schleier. Schleier acknowledged that "the
intangible harms of discrimination can constitute personal in-
jury, and that compensation for such harms may be excludable
under § 104(a)(2),"198 meaning that compensatory damages for
emotional distress caused by an "economically-related" tortious
employer would be excludable (until effectiveness of the 1996
194. See supra note 31.
195. Cf Maxwell v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 107 (1990), in which the Tax Court held
that a corporate officer could assert a tort claim against, and recover excludable personal
injury damages from, his controlled corporation, although the court must carefully scru-
tinize the transaction because the parties were not at arm's length.
196. See generally GRANT GILmORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (discussing the
changes that have taken place in contract law which support the hypothesis that con-
tract law has been reabsorbed into the mainstream of tort law).
197. The Service, as tax administrator, has applied an exclusion for all lost wages
in physical injury cases by not litigating the exclusion, whether or not the damages are
economic in nature. Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32. By contrast, the Service attempts
to make a personal/economic distinction in nonphysical injury cases, an overwhelming
majority of which involve victims who were employed by the tortfeasors. For a list of
some of the many employment discrimination cases, see infra Part II. Other pre-
existing-economic-relation cases include situations where (1) the tortfeasors bought the
victim's business, Fono v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680 (1982); (2) the tortfeasor supplied
services to the victim, Baca v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. 1433 (1990); and (3) the
tortfeasor and victim were involved in a real estate sale and related litigation, Threlkeld
v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1296 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
198. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 332 n.6.
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Act's physical injury requirement).199 Similarly, since the 1996
Act's physical injury requirement came into effect, physical in-
jury damages received from an economically-related tortfeasor
can be excluded.
The causation rule of Schleier appears to presume that,
when a pre-existing economic relationship exists, damages are
caused by the relationship's pre-existing economic rights, rather
than by tort claims, unless a direct link is shown between the
injury (now a physical injury) and the damages.200 The few post-
Schleier cases are consistent with that reading. Both in Banks
and Knevelbaard, the shorthand rationales used by the courts
graphically demonstrate the point; in Banks, "Unions do not pay
wages,"20 1 and in Knevelbaard, "banks do not buy milk."20 2 The
central element in each description is the absence of any pre-
existing economic relationship. Without that relationship, we
know that the damages calculations, whether made with regard
to lost wages or unpaid-for milk, were made to approximate tor-
tiously caused harm and were not made to satisfy pre-existing
contract rights.
When describing the proper boundary of § 104(a)(2), Profes-
sor Kahn argued that the distinction should be between injuries
associated primarily with commercial activities and those prima-
rily associated with noncommercial activities, but rejected it in
favor of a physical/nonphysical distinction because of the admin-
istrative problems in applying a commercial/noncommercial dis-
tinction.20 3 The administrative problems with that distinction
are chronicled in the Tax Court's short-lived attempt to distin-
guish personal and business libel,20 4 but administrative conve-
nience is not the only difficulty. As the Tax Court found out
when trying to apply that distinction, persons do not cleave eas-
ily into commercial and noncommercial halves or into personal
and business halves. 20 5
Conversely, § 104(a)(2) cases easily cleave into those which
involve and do not involve economically-related persons, a dis-
tinction which serves two aims: (1) fitting within the kindness
rationale, since the anomalous exclusion of lost wages cannot be
199. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
200. Brabson v. United States, 73 F.3d 1040, 1047 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S.Ct. 607 (1996).
201. Banks, 81 F.3d at 876.
202. Knevelbaard, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) at 168 n.8.
203. See Kahn, supra note 18, at 357-58.
204. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
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adequately explained by the human capital theory; and (2) pre-
serving the tax system's signal focus on the exchange of contrac-
tual rights. We are kind to tort victims, but much as Burke de-
fined "tort" for tax purposes as a cause of action for which broad
remedies are available, we define "tort victims for tax purposes"
as those (1) victims of not-economically-related persons or (2)
victims of economically-related persons who have overcome the
presumption that their recovery was rooted in the economic
relationship.
Let's return to our hypothetical sexual harassment victim
and apply the Schleier presumption on causation. Absent physi-
cal injury, no exclusion issue arises. Assume our range of physi-
cal injury: (1) any offensive touching, (2) some physical manifes-
tation of injury, like a bruise or a "breaking of the skin," (3)
injury requiring "medical care" or (4) injury requiring a period
of convalescence. Schleier suggests that only in the last situation
are the lost wages "caused" by physical injury. For any of the
other three, we would say under Schleier that the reason that
the victim absented herself from the workplace was emotional
distress, or fear of being touched, not physical injury.
VI. APPENDIX-THE EFFECTIVE DATES QUESTIONS
In Burke, the Supreme Court held that sex discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex, religion
and national origin, was not tort-like because Title VII then Jim-
ited remedies to back pay.20 6 In Schleier, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the ADEA was not tort-like because:
Like the pre-1991 version of Title VII, the ADEA provides no compensa-
tion "for any of the other traditional harms associated with personal in-
jury." Monetary remedies under the ADEA are limited to back wages,
which are clearly of an "economic character," and liquidated damages,
which we have already noted serve no compensatory function. Thus,
though this is a closer case than Burke, we conclude that a recovery
under the ADEA is not one that is "based upon tort or tort-type
rights. 207
The damages recoverable under the employment discrimina-
tion statutes were broadened significantly by the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. A new section, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994), applies
concurrently with and in addition to Title VII. It permits recov-
206. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
207. Schleier, 515 US. at 336.
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ery of "compensatory and punitive damages," subject to aggre-
gate limits of between $50,000 and $300,000, depending on the
size of the employer, for "unlawful intentional discrimination" in
employment on the basis of race, sex, religion and national ori-
gin under Title VII and Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA7)
disparate treatment claims.208 Additionally, a jury trial is availa-
ble for § 1981a claims. °9
After Burke but before Schleier, the Service acknowledged
in Revenue Ruling 93-88210 an exclusion for all amounts recov-
ered under (1) Title VII gender-based disparate treatment (in-
tentional discrimination) claims as amended by the Civil Rights
Act of 1991; (2) Title VII racial discrimination claims as
amended; and (3) Americans with Disabilities Act claims, be-
cause the claims, as amended, gave rise to remedies sufficiently
broad to be considered tort-like.211 The ruling based itself on the
Court's dicta in Burke, in which the Court implied that all dam-
ages recovered under § 1981 would be excludable.212 Following
the decision in Schleier on June 14, 1995, the Service suspended
Revenue Ruling 93-88.213
In Revenue Ruling 96-65,214 published December 30, 1996,
and with an effective date of June 14, 1995 (the date of decision
in Schleier), the Service ruled that under post-1996 Act
§104(a)(2), post-1991-CRA, backpay and damages for emotional
distress are included in income.215 However, under pre-1996 Act
§104(a)(2), post-1991-CRA, backpay is included in income while
damages received for emotional distress are excludable from
gross income.216
208. 42 US.C. § 1981a (1994).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994).
210. 1993-2 C.B. 61.
211. Id. at 62-63.
212. Id. at 62.
213. I.R.S. Notice 95-45, 1995-34 I.R.B. 20.
214. 1996-2 C.B. 6.
215. Id. at 7.
216. Id.
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